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ABSTRACT
The rules that should govern political campaign intervention by
social welfare organizations exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(4)
of the Internal Revenue Code have been the subject of recent
controversy. Long before all the attention, a group of dedicated and
experienced experts on the topic, under the auspices of two wellknown nonprofit groups, undertook the task of clarifying the rules
regarding tax-exempt political activity. In light of the issues becoming
national news, the group, known as the Bright Lines Project, also
converted the regulatory proposal into legislative language. These two
versions of the same rules—as a set of regulations and as a set of
statutes—provide a natural laboratory to compare the administrative
law implications of choosing between legislation and regulation to
establish a set of tax rules. This Article undertakes that examination. It
concludes that, if revenue rulings interpreting regulations are afforded
deference under Auer v. Robbins and Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., promulgating the initial definition of political campaign
intervention as a set of regulations may well give the Internal Revenue
Service greater power to police political campaign intervention by
exempt organizations than would the enactment of detailed
legislation. It recommends, however, that broad statutory guidance,
followed by regulations, and then by revenue rulings strike the best
balance between democratic concerns and administrative flexibility.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 10, 2013, at a session of the American Bar Association
Tax Section meeting in Washington, D.C., Lois Lerner, then the
director of the Exempt Organization Division of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS, or Service), apologized for IRS mishandling of
applications by Tea Party groups for exemption as social welfare
1
groups under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). A
few days later, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) Inspector
General released a report concluding that the “IRS used
inappropriate criteria that identified for review Tea Party and other
organizations applying for tax-exempt status based upon their names
or policy positions instead of indications of potential political
2
campaign intervention.”
A storm of controversy followed, with Republicans leading the
3
charge. During the course of the controversy, those who saw the IRS
efforts as inept rather than malicious repeatedly pointed out the
difficulty the IRS faced in applying ambiguous regulations to

1. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012); Fred Stokeld, IRS Sparks Outrage with Admission It
Mistreated Tea Party Groups, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 13, 2013, available at LEXIS, 2013 TNT
92-3.
2. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF TREASURY, 2013-10-053,
INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR
REVIEW (2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.
pdf.
3. See Memorandum from Majority Staff, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to
Members, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, Interim Update on the Committee’s
Investigation of the Internal Revenue Service’s Inappropriate Treatment of Certain TaxExempt Applicants (Sept. 17, 2013), available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2013/09/2013-09-17-Interim-update-on-IRS-Investigation-of-tax-exempt-applicants.pdf.
For a discussion of five other hearings held by various House and Senate committees, see Josh
Hicks, Five and Counting: Yet Another IRS Hearing, WASH. POST FED. EYE BLOG (June 4,
2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/04/five-andcounting-yet-another-irs-hearing.

APRILL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/21/2014 9:08 AM

LEGISLATION VS. REGULATION

1637

4

applications for exemption. Under the language of I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)
organizations must be operated “exclusively for the promotion of
5
social welfare.” Treasury Regulations § 1.501(c)(4)–1, however,
states, “An organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of
social welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the
6
common good and general welfare of the people of the community.”
The regulations further specify that “promotion of social welfare does
not include direct or indirect participation or intervention in political
campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public
7
office” —that is, political campaign intervention. Nowhere, however,
has the IRS ever defined what constitutes primary activity, and some
practitioners argue that 49 percent of a § 501(c)(4) organization’s
8
activities can consist of political intervention.

4. See, e.g., ERIKA K. LUNDER & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40183, 501(C)(4)S AND CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY: ANALYSIS UNDER TAX AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAWS 5–6 (2013), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40183.pdf; NAT’L
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND THE RIGHTS OF APPLICANTS FOR TAX-EXEMPT STATUS 14–15
(2013), available at http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/FullReport/SpecialReport.pdf; DANIEL WERFEL, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CHARTING A PATH FORWARD AT
THE IRS: INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND PLAN OF ACTION 28 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/newsroom/Initial%20Assessment%20and%20Plan%20of%20Action.pdf; Conflicting Laws,
Ambiguous Language Help Fuel IRS Confusion, CBS DC (June 5, 2013, 8:23 AM),
http://washington.cbslocal.com/2013/06/05/conflicting-laws-ambiguous-language-help-fuel-irsconfusion; Brendan Fischer, Ambiguity in Tax Rules and Disintegration of Election Law May
Have Led to IRS Tea Party Mess, PR WATCH (May 15, 2013), http://www.prwatch.org/news/
2013/05/12109/ambiguity-tax-rules-and-disintegration-election-law-may-have-led-irs-tea-partyme.
5. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A).
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990) (emphasis added); see also
Ellen P. Aprill, The IRS’s Tea Party Tax Row: How ‘Exclusively’ Became ‘Primarily,’ PAC.
STANDARD (June 7, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.psmag.com/politics/the-irss-tea-party-tax-rowhow-exclusively-became-primarily-59451 (noting the seeming conflict between the language of
the statute and the regulation, but recognizing that “problems regarding excessive campaign
intervention by these kinds of organizations will not be solved, at a penstroke [sic], by simply
returning to the statutory requirement” of exclusivity).
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(ii).
8. See, e.g., SECTION OF TAXATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, COMMENTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
MEMBERS OF THE EXEMPT ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE’S TASK FORCE ON SECTION 501(C)(4)
AND POLITICS (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/tax/
pubpolicy/2004/040525exo.authcheckdam.pdf; Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of
Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363, 381 (2011); Lily
Kahng, The IRS Tea Party Controversy and Administrative Discretion, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
ONLINE 41, 45 (2013), http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2013/09/99CLRO411.pdf. See generally
Miriam Galston, Vision Service Plan v. U.S.: Implications for Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4)s,
53 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 165 (2006).
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Quantifying the permissible amount of political campaign
intervention for § 501(c)(4) organizations, however, will not be
sufficient to resolve the current problems regarding classification of
§ 501(c)(4) organizations. Exempt organizations and their advisors
also need to know what constitutes political campaign intervention
9
before they can know how much of it there is or should be. As the
Bright Lines Project (BLP)—the focus of this Article—has explained,
“[I]t has become apparent that a major factor in this systematic
breakdown of the review process is the lack of clear, neutral,
objective standards by which IRS employees and managers could
determine whether applicants were engaged in political
10
intervention.” Similarly, a 2013 IRS report stated, “One of the
significant challenges . . . has been the lack of a clear and concise
11
definition of ‘political campaign intervention.’”
Currently, the IRS uses the same criteria to define political
campaign intervention by § 501(c)(4) organizations, which are
permitted to engage in some uncertain quantity of political campaign
intervention, as it does in the context of § 501(c)(3) charitable
organizations, which are prohibited from any political campaign
12
intervention. Revenue Ruling 2007-41, the most recent and
9. The IRS and Treasury included “[g]uidance under §501(c)(4) relating to measurement
of an organization’s primary activity and whether it is operated primarily for the promotion of
social welfare, including guidance relating to political campaign intervention” in their firstquarter update, see MARK J. MAZUR, DANIEL I. WERFEL & WILLIAM J. WILKINS, DEP’T OF
TREASURY, FIRST QUARTER UPDATE TO THE 2013–2014 PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN (2013),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2013-2014_pgp_1st_quarter_update.pdf, as well as in
the 2013–2014 Priority Guidance Plan, see MARK J. MAZUR, DANIEL I. WERFEL & WILLIAM J.
WILKINS, DEP’T OF TREASURY, 2013–2014 PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2013-2014_pgp.pdf. However, when proposed regulations relating
to § 501(c)(4), discussed in Part III, were released in late November 2013, they did not make a
proposal regarding the definition of “primary activity,” but simply asked for comments on the
issue. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2), 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,537–38 (Nov. 29,
2013). Instead, as a first step, the guidance proposed a definition of candidate-related political
activities for § 501(c)(4) organizations. See id. at 71,538–40. The notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) asked for comments on the meaning of primary activity. Id. at 71,537–38.
10. Regulatory Solutions, BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, http://www.brightlinesproject.org/
summary (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
11. WERFEL, supra note 4, at 20.
12. See Aprill, supra note 8, at 391. At the end of November 2013, the IRS and Treasury issued
proposed regulations defining candidate-related activity for § 501(c)(4) organizations. See supra note
9. The NPRM asked whether similar regulations should be adopted for § 501(c)(5) and § 501(c)(6)
and perhaps even § 501(c)(3) organizations, although the NPRM stated that, because political
campaign intervention is absolutely prohibited for § 501(c)(3) organizations, “a more nuanced
consideration of the totality of facts and circumstances may be appropriate in that context.” Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2), 78 Fed. Reg. at 71,537.
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comprehensive official IRS pronouncement on the subject, explains
that “[w]hether an organization is participating or intervening,
directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in
opposition to any candidate for public office depends upon all of the
13
facts and circumstances of each case.” As I have written elsewhere,
IRS reliance—in these and other revenue rulings—on facts and
circumstances “reaches broadly, gives discretion to the
administrators, and leaves many organizations and their advisors with
14
little certainty on how to conduct their activities day to day.” A
number of commentators, including myself, have called for the IRS
and Treasury to promulgate clear rules as to what constitutes political
15
campaign intervention.
A dedicated group of experienced, well-known, and respected
experts on exempt organizations has taken it upon itself to
accomplish this task, calling its efforts the BLP. This group has
operated under the chairmanship of Gregory Colvin of Adler &
Colvin in San Francisco, and the vice chairmanship of Elizabeth
Kingsley of Harmon, Curran, Spielberg, & Eisenberg in Washington,
16
D.C. The group developed its proposals under the sponsorship of
two well-known nonprofit organizations. Starting in 2008, the group
worked under the auspices of OMB Watch (now the Center for

13. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. Issuance of the revenue ruling followed issuance
of an IRS fact sheet which included similar but not identical examples, but which did not
represent official guidance or advice of the national IRS office and thus was not a document on
which taxpayers could rely as authority. See Fred Stokeld, IRS Issues Guidance on Charities and
Politics as Election Year Looms, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 8, 2007, available at LEXIS, 2007
TNT 111-4 (compiling comments of exempt-organization specialists comparing the fact sheet to
the revenue ruling).
14. Aprill, supra note 8, at 386.
15. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Why the IRS Should Want To Develop Rules Regarding Charities
and Politics, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 668–69 (2012); James Bopp, Jr. & Zachary S. Kester,
Holding the Service’s Feet to the Fire: Applying Citizens United and the First Amendment to the
IRC § 501(c)(3) Political Prohibition, ENGAGE, Dec. 2010, at 75, 77; Kay Guinane, Wanted: A
Bright-Line Test Defining Prohibited Intervention in Elections by 501(c)(3) Organizations, 5
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 142, 143 (2007); Elizabeth Kingsley, Bright Lines? Safe Harbors?, 20
TAX’N EXEMPTS, July/Aug. 2008, at 38, 42.
16. See Staff and Drafting Committee, BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, http://www.
brightlinesproject.org/blp-team (last visited Jan. 30, 2014). Other members of the drafting
committee are Eve Borenstein, Borenstein and McVeigh; Terence Dougherty, American Civil
Liberties Union; Rosemary Fei, Adler & Colvin; James Joseph, Arnold & Porter; Abby Levine,
Alliance for Justice; John Pomeranz, Harmon, Curran, Spielberg + Eisenberg; and Ezra Reese,
Perkins Coie. Id.
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Effective Government); since November 2012, it has been housed at
17
Public Citizen.
The BLP’s effort began “many years ago with the assumption
that the project should focus on encouraging the IRS to modify its
regulations regarding tax exempt political activity so that the rules are
18
clearer.” Recently, however, in “light of the tax exemption
determination process becoming national news” and attracting
congressional attention, “leaders in the [BLP] have worked to convert
the regulatory proposal developed over four years into legislative
19
language” as a possible alternative. The BLP describes its proposed
§ 4956 on political campaign intervention as tracking its regulatory
20
proposal.
Participants in the BLP have been discussing its suggestions with
21
both tax administrators and legislators. Recently, a number of other
nonprofit groups have endorsed its efforts, including, perhaps most
22
importantly, Independent Sector, which is a coalition of some six
hundred nonprofit organizations that describes itself as “the
leadership network for nonprofits, foundations, and corporate giving
programs committed to advancing the common good in America and
23
around the world.” Other well-known groups that have endorsed the
BLP include the Brennan Center for Justice, the Center for
Responsive Politics, and the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
24
Washington.

17. See About Us, BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, http://www.brightlinesproject.org/about-us
(last visited Jan. 30, 2014). Public Citizen has a four-decades-long history of successfully
influencing public policy. See About Us, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=
2306 (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
18. Regulatory Solutions, supra note 10.
19. Legislative Solutions, BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, http://www.brightlinesproject.org/
legislative-solutions (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
20. Id. The legislative proposal also makes modifications to § 527, the provision governing
political organization, in order to make it “easier for tax-exempt groups that may engage in too
much political activity to move those activities to a 527 organization.” Id. While amending § 527
would be an important and useful legislative change, this Article will not discuss it further
because it does not have a parallel regulatory proposal. Bringing consistency to § 501(c) and
§ 527, however, would be an important advantage of the legislative proposal. See Aprill, supra
note 8, at 392.
21. See Email from Tom Halloran, Project Coordinator, Bright Lines Project, to author
(Oct. 3, 2013, 9:39 AM) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
22. BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, http://www.brightlinesproject.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
23. About Us, INDEP. SECTOR, http://www.independentsector.org/about#sthash.xKIcWwdJ.
dpbs (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
24. See BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 22.
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A number of commentators active in the nonprofit community
25
have raised questions about aspects of the BLP. Consideration of
particular criticisms, however, is not this Article’s focus. Instead, I
want to take advantage of the BLP as a kind of natural laboratory for
purposes of the intersection of tax law and administrative law. The
BLP has provided a set of provisions intended to create the same
definition of political campaign intervention for § 501(c)
organizations in two different forms—as a set of regulations and as a
set of statutes. Both approaches, however, will call for further
administrative guidance, guidance that could take a number of forms.
Depending on whether the initial set of definitions is embodied in a
statute or in regulations, administrative guidance will have different
levels of authority and will call for different degrees of judicial
deference. That is, the BLP regulatory proposal and the BLP
legislative proposal offer a unique opportunity to examine and
compare the administrative law implications of choosing between
regulations and legislation to establish a set of tax rules.
A likely assumption would be that establishing this definition of
political campaign intervention in legislation would give government
agencies the greatest possible authority to impose limits on such
activity. My thesis is that the opposite is likely to be the case.
Establishing these definitions as regulations will offer advantages to
the tax administrative agencies. If the concept is defined in statutory
language, regulations later promulgated by the IRS and Treasury to
clarify aspects of the statute run some risk that a court would hold
them invalid as inconsistent with congressional intent. Promulgating
the definition initially as a set of regulations without new statutory
authority does not carry the same risk, given the ambiguity in the
current statutory language. Moreover, whether the initial set of
definitions comes in regulations or in the I.R.C., it is also likely that at
least some later guidance would come in the form of revenue rulings,
25. See, e.g., Barnaby Zall, The Tie Goes to the Speaker, Not the Censor: Proposals To
Change Definitions of Permissible Political Activities by Section 501(c)(4) Organizations (Sept.
20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://meetings.abanet.org/meeting/tax/
FALL13/media/jt-eo-cpg-helping-zall-paper.pdf; Bob Bauer, The IRS and “Bright Lines,”
MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW (May 28, 2013), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/
05/irs-bright-lines; Nonprofit Blogger, The Bright Lines Project: Good Work, but It Needs
Another Bright Line, NONPROFIT L. PROF BLOG (June 24, 2013), http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/nonprofit/2013/06/the-bright-lines-project-good-work-but-it-needs-another-brightline.html; Joe Trotter, “Bright Lines Project” Fails To Live Up to Its Name, CENTER FOR
COMPETITIVE POL. (July 12, 2013), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2013/07/12/bright-linesproject-fails-to-live-up-to-its-name-2.

APRILL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1642

4/21/2014 9:08 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1635

which are interpretations of a particular set of facts published by the
26
IRS in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. In the case of revenue rulings,
27
judicial application of deference under Auer v. Robbins and Bowles
28
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. (Auer/Seminole Rock deference) to
tax revenue rulings would give greater authority to revenue rulings
interpreting regulations than to revenue rulings interpreting a
29
statute. In short, promulgating the initial definition of political
campaign intervention as a set of regulations may well give the IRS
greater power to police political campaign intervention by exempt
organizations than would enactment of legislation.
Part I describes the BLP. Part II considers the administrative law
implications of the BLP legislative proposal. Part III does the same
for the regulatory proposal.
I. SUMMARY OF THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT
The BLP describes the central principle guiding its efforts as
follows: “[T]he federal tax definition of political speech . . . reaches
beyond express advocacy and covers all speech that supports or
30
opposes a candidate for elective public office.” In order to provide
needed guidance to § 501(c) organizations and to carry out this
principle, the BLP has developed a set of provisions to define political
campaign intervention. These provisions explain the scope of the
provisions, detail their application to other provisions of the I.R.C.,
and set forth what activities would always be treated as political
campaign intervention, what activities might be treated as political
campaign intervention, and what safe harbors are available.
31
The BLP is structured as six categorical rules. The first rule
gives the basic scope of the proposal by defining some key
preliminary terms. It calls for the BLP proposal to apply to any
“[f]ederal, state, local, and foreign election” and includes in the

26. For a discussion of revenue rulings, see infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
27. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
28. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
29. See infra notes 170–75 and accompanying text.
30. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT: CLARIFYING IRS RULES
ON POLITICAL INTERVENTION, DRAFTING COMMITTEE EXPLANATION INTERIM DRAFT 2
(2013),
available
at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Bright%20Lines%20Project%20
Explanation.pdf (emphasis omitted).
31. See THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT: CLARIFYING THE IRS
RULES FOR POLITICAL INTERVENTION (2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
Bright-Lines-Proposal-(May%202013).pdf.
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definition of candidate “a person who offers himself or herself for
election to public office or whose election the organization expressly
32
proposes, supports, or opposes.”
The second rule proposes a broad application of the BLP’s
definition of political campaign intervention. The BLP would apply
its proposal to “the prohibition on IRC 501(c)(3) organizations and
the tax penalties under 4955 and 4945, . . . political intervention that is
not within exempt purposes for other 501(c) groups, . . . the proxy tax
paid by some 501(c) entities under 6033(e), and . . . the denial of a
33
business expense deduction under 162(e)(1)(B).”
The BLP’s third rule defines political campaign intervention to
34
include express advocacy, including any communication that is the
35
functional equivalent of express advocacy. The Drafting Committee
includes the following example of a communication that is the
functional equivalent of express advocacy:
An organization in State X runs a television advertisement with the
following text:
What kind of leader is Senator Doe? Ineffective. Ultra-liberal.
Unrepresentative of our state’s values. Senator Doe voted for
increasing Tricare premiums to nickel and dime America’s heroes.
Veterans and service men and women know better than to trust
Senator Doe. This November: support new voices, support your
36
military, support State X values.

The Drafting Committee also notes,

32. Id.
33. Id. The IRS and Treasury have recently proposed a definition of “candidate-related
political activity” for § 501(c)(4) organizations. They asked whether the proposed regulations
should apply as well to other § 501(c) organizations, but suggested a different set of regulations
might be appropriate for § 501(c)(3) organizations. See supra note 9; infra note 135.
34. The rule describes express advocacy as:
(a) the election, defeat, nomination, or recall of a clearly-identified candidate;
(b) the election or defeat of candidates affiliated with a specific political party;
(c) that voters select candidates for support or opposition based on one or more
criteria that clearly distinguish certain candidates from other candidates;
(d) the making of contributions to a candidate, party, or any organization that has the
primary purpose of engaging in political intervention.
THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 31.
35. See THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 30, at 9.
36. Id. at 9–10. Parts II and III focus on the format in which administrative guidance
incorporating examples would be issued and the deference courts would give that guidance.
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Historically, the IRS interpretation of the ban on political
intervention by charities has been widely understood to go beyond
express advocacy . . . . However, it is important to capture those
instances of speech that do constitute express advocacy as a starting
point for determining what speech undeniably should be within the
37
definition of political intervention . . . .

Consistent with its central principle, the BLP goes further. Its
fourth rule, dubbed the General Speech Rule, broadens the definition
of political campaign intervention to cover “any communication to
any part of the electorate” if the communication both “refers to a
38
clearly identified candidate” and “reflects a view on that candidate.”
This fourth rule offers four safe harbors, which are applicable only if
the communication does not consist of paid media advertising. The
safe harbors comprise influencing official action, comparing
candidates, acting in self-defense, and making personal oral remarks
39
at official meetings. The Drafting Committee Explanation offers a
nice example of the distinction between the general rule and the safe
harbors:
Organization S prepares and distributes a posting on a social media
site criticizing the fact that state C’s two senators voted against the
Marriage Protection Amendment, and asking viewers to call them to
urge them to support it. Contemporary news reports indicate that it
is likely, but not certain, that a vote will be scheduled on the
Marriage Protection Amendment in the near future. Organization S
has not engaged in political intervention. However, if there was no
reasonable chance that a vote on the issue would be held before the
40
election, the communication would not qualify for the safe harbor.

The fifth rule further expands the definition of political campaign
intervention to cover supplying any of the organization’s resources to
another person or entity for use in political campaign intervention, at
41
least if such use is reasonably foreseeable. According to the Drafting

37. Id. at 8.
38. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 31.
39. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 30, at 15–24. The last safe harbor represents a
major change. In many cases, it would, for example, protect remarks of a minister made from
the pulpit. See Nonprofit Blogger, supra note 25.
40. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 30, at 17. The Drafting Committee
Explanation includes a total of thirty-five examples, see id. at 9–10, 16–18, 20–23, 27–29, 31–33,
of which twenty-one relate to the safe harbors, see id. at 16–18, 20–23.
41. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 31.
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Committee Explanation, an example of such use of resources is the
following:
Save the Canines, a tax-exempt organization, allows City Council
Member W to use its auditorium, free of charge, for a Town Hall
Forum to discuss City Council business, including a proposed dog
park. W is running for reelection, and her campaign sets up a table
in the auditorium handing out campaign literature, bumper stickers,
and requests for campaign contributions. There is no written rental
agreement, and Save the Canines officials are present at the event
and do not say anything about the campaign activity. Under local
election law, in-kind contributions of $500 or more must be reported
42
as campaign contributions.

A number of exceptions apply to the “transfer of resources” category
as well: transfers at no less than fair market value, a history of similar
transactions by the organization, and transfers that do not favor any
43
candidate.
44
The sixth rule introduces “facts and circumstances” to the BLP.
For communications that do not meet the threshold of the General
Speech Rule, that are not targeted to voters, and that do not come
within an exception, the BLP’s sixth recommended rule would permit
consideration of such factors as “timing, the range of issues discussed,
disclaimers and disclosures, the organization’s history, the
impartiality of its methods, or corrective steps taken” in both
determining whether political campaign intervention has taken place
45
and in considering any penalty for violations. The Drafting
Committee Explanation includes the following example:
On October 5, Louisiana Moms Against Guns runs a final
newspaper ad thanking Governor D for his courageous act in signing
into law a bill banning the carrying of concealed weapons on school
grounds, after running a series of ads urging him to do so. Louisiana
Moms makes a practice of running “thank you” ads when the target
of a lobbying campaign takes the requested action. Governor D is
up for re-election in November. The Governor signed the bill on
October 4. The ad does not include express advocacy, but refers to a
clearly-identified candidate and reflects a view on that candidate. It

42. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 30, at 28.
43. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 31.
44. Id. Because this set of provisions relies on facts and circumstances, rather than bright
lines, it has been particularly controversial. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
45. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 31.
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is a paid mass media ad and therefore cannot fall within any of the
safe harbor exceptions. Considering these as the only pertinent facts
and circumstances, due to the close proximity of the ad to the
official action, the fact that the ad does not mention the Governor’s
reelection, and the organization’s history of running similar ads, the
organization has met its burden of proof that intervention did not
46
occur.

The BLP legislative proposal does not, of course, include the
Drafting Committee’s examples. It does, however, grant regulatory
authority. This regulatory authority is unusual in that it is, on the one
hand, very detailed and, on the other hand, sweeping in its goals:
The Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe, update, and modify
such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to clarify
further the standards set forth in this section in light of current and
future changes in campaign practices, to meet the objectives of this
section to promote civic participation in democracy, curb abuses,
and allow organizations to reasonably anticipate the tax
47
consequences of their activities in advance.

Other broad delegations of regulatory authority, in contrast, do not
48
specify motive or purpose. For example, § 1502, perhaps the
broadest grant of regulatory authority in the I.R.C., given the
sparseness of the legislative language in § 1501 providing the statutory
rules governing consolidated returns, states that
[t]he Secretary shall prescribe such regulations, as he may deem
necessary in order that the tax liability of any affiliated group of
corporations making a consolidated return and of each corporation
in the group . . . may be returned, determined, computed, assessed,
collected, and adjusted, in such manner as clearly to reflect the
income-tax liability and the various factors necessary for the

46. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 30, at 32.
47. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS: NEW SECTION 4956, at 5
(2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/new-section-4956-political-intervention.
pdf. For the reasons explained below, the BLP should amend the regulatory grant in its
legislative proposal to more closely resemble other broad grants of regulatory authority. See
infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
48. See generally Kimberly S. Blanchard, N.Y.S. Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Report on
Legislative Grants of Regulatory Authority, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 7, 2006, available at
LEXIS, 2006 TNT 215-22 (cataloguing and comparing regulator grants in the I.R.C.).
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determination of such liability, and in order to prevent avoidance of
49
such tax liability.

The regulations under § 1502 run to almost 350 pages of small print.
The regulatory grant under § 469, the passive loss provisions, states
that “the Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be
50
necessary or appropriate to carry out provisions of this section,”
although it also names some specific issues the regulations might
51
address.
Regulations promulgated under the statutory grant of authority
proposed by the BLP could well include the examples discussed in the
52
Drafting Committee Explanation. Such regulations, however, would
stand on a slightly different ground than regulations promulgated
without such a specific statutory grant of authority, as detailed further
below.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT’S LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSAL
Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution declares, “All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
53
United States.” Section 8 grants Congress authority “to make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution” enumerated powers and “all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
54
Department or Officer thereof.”
As a result, both courts and administrative agencies must defer
to enacted legislation. As the Supreme Court stated in the nowfamous Step One of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources

49. I.R.C. § 1502 (2012). The regulatory grant does contain some additional general
direction. For example, it specifies that “the Secretary may prescribe rules that are different
from the provisions of chapter 1 that would apply if such corporations filed separate returns.”
Id.
50. Id. § 469(l).
51. Section 469(l) lists four possible regulatory topics, including, for example, “what
constitutes an activity, material participation, or active participation for purposes of this
section.” Id.
52. Treasury regulations frequently include examples. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.117-2(b)(3)
(1960) (scholarships); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9T(f)(4)(iv) (2008) (public support test for
charities); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(2)(iv) (as amended in 2011) (valuation of annuities for
estate tax purposes).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
54. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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55

Defense Council, Inc., “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
56
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Thus, if the
BLP legislative proposal is adopted—thereby rendering its
recommendations as statutory provisions, its recommendations
themselves, at least to the extent they are clear, would have greater
authority than essentially the same provisions adopted in the form of
regulations promulgated under current I.R.C. provisions.
Step Two of Chevron, however, directs that, if Congress has not
unambiguously expressed its intent, a court is to ask only “whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
57
statute.” If so, Chevron explains, the court is to defer to the
administrative agency. In the words of Professor Cass Sunstein, this
highly deferential standard to administrative agencies represents “a
kind of revolution[,] . . . not only as a counter-Marbury for the
modern era but also as a kind of McCulloch v. Maryland, granting the
executive broad discretion to choose its own preferred means to
58
promote statutory ends.”
Under Step Two of Chevron, were the IRS and Treasury to
follow up on the BLP legislative proposal with regulations—at least
59
those that go through notice-and-comment rulemaking, examples of
55. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
56. Id. at 842–43. Of course, statutes themselves can be held unconstitutional. Some critics
of the BLP find its broad definition of political campaign intervention inconsistent with current
First Amendment doctrine. See Zall, supra note 25, at 33–34; Trotter, supra note 25. Under
Chevron if the statute is not clear, courts move to Step Two and defer to administrative agencies
unless the agency interpretation is unreasonable. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
However, “[t]he Supreme Court has reversed an agency interpretation as unreasonable under
Step Two only twice, so most of the judicial focus has targeted Step One and the search for
unambiguous statutory meaning.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY &
ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 328–29 (2d ed. 2006)
(footnote omitted).
57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
58. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the Law Is, 115
YALE L.J. 2580, 2596 (2006) (footnote omitted).
59. In United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), the Supreme Court wrote that
Chevron deference would apply
when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Delegation of such authority may
be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or
notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable
congressional intent.
Id. at 226–27. As Professor Hickman notes, “Since deciding Mead, the Court has often linked
the agency’s use of notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures with a rule’s eligibility for
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which are included in the BLP regulatory proposal—it is likely that
courts would defer to these regulations and give them the force of
law, given the need to further explain the statutory terms and the
60
broad grant of regulatory authority in the proposed legislation. This
treatment would particularly be the case if the legislative history of
the statute were to include examples that now appear in the Drafting
Committee Explanation.
Nonetheless, enactment of the rules as a statute could constrain
the IRS and Treasury in promulgating regulations. “The
judiciary . . . must reject administrative constructions which are
61
contrary to clear congressional intent.” It is thus conceivable that a
court could view some regulation promulgated in the future as
inconsistent with the statute. In this regard, the detailed language of
the regulatory grant could prove problematic. For example, a court
could decide that some old regulation promulgated under this
proposed statute no longer reflected current campaign practices or
could deem some future regulation adopted for administrative
convenience as inconsistent with the regulatory requirement that
62
regulations “promote civic participation in democracy.”
The IRS, however, could well choose to give guidance through a
series of revenue rulings interpreting the statute rather than through
promulgating regulations. Revenue rulings are official IRS
interpretations that appear in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.
Revenue Procedure 2012-4 further defines a revenue ruling as “the
conclusion of the Service on how the law is applied to a specific set of
facts . . . published for the information and guidance of taxpayers,
63
Service personnel, and other interested parties.” Procedural IRS
regulations state that the purpose of revenue rulings is
to promote correct and uniform application of the tax laws by
Internal Revenue Service employees and to assist taxpayers in
attaining maximum voluntary compliance by informing Service

Chevron deference.” Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465,
489 (2013); see id. at 489 n.125 (citing cases). For further discussion of Mead, see infra notes 75–
93 and accompanying text.
60. See Hickman, supra note 59, at 475–77.
61. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
62. THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT, supra note 47, at 5.
63. Rev. Proc. 2012-4, 2012-1 I.R.B. 125, 130. The IRS also explains in the introduction to
each issue of the Internal Revenue Bulletin that guidance published therein, such as revenue
procedures and revenue rulings, “do[es] not have the force and effect of Treasury Department
Regulations.” 2013-44 I.R.B. 426.
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personnel and the public of National Office interpretations of the
internal revenue laws, related statutes, treaties, regulations, and
statements of Service procedures affecting the rights and duties of
64
taxpayers.

Taxpayers generally may rely on revenue rulings as guidance
regarding the application of the tax law to “substantially the same”
65
facts.
The current precedential guidance regarding the meaning of
political campaign intervention relies on revenue rulings and the
examples they contain. Revenue Ruling 2007-41, in addition to stating
the facts-and-circumstances standard, provides twenty-one situations
to illustrate its principle as to what is and is not political campaign
66
intervention for § 501(c)(3) organizations. Revenue Ruling 2004-6
offers six situations to clarify political campaign intervention for
67
purposes of § 527, the provision governing political organizations.

64. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1987).
65. Id. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(e).
66. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1422–26. Situation 13, for example, states:
Mayor G attends a concert performed by Symphony S, a section 501(c)(3)
organization, in City Park. The concert is free and open to the public. Mayor G is a
candidate for reelection, and the concert takes place after the primary and before the
general election. During the concert, the chairman of S’s board addresses the crowd
and says, “I am pleased to see Mayor G here tonight. Without his support, these free
concerts in City Park would not be possible. We will need his help if we want these
concerts to continue next year so please support Mayor G in November as he has
supported us.” As a result of these remarks, Symphony S has engaged in political
campaign intervention.
Id. at 1424.
67. Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328, 330–32. In Situation 2, for example:
O, a trade association recognized as tax exempt under § 501(c)(6), advocates for
increased international trade. Senator C represents State V in the United States
Senate. O prepares and finances a full-page newspaper advertisement that is
published in several large circulation newspapers in State V shortly before an election
in which Senator C is a candidate for nomination in a party primary. The
advertisement states that increased international trade is important to a major
industry in State V. The advertisement states that S. 24, a pending bill in the United
States Senate, would provide manufacturing subsidies to certain industries to
encourage export of their products. The advertisement also states that several
manufacturers in State V would benefit from the subsidies, but Senator C has
opposed similar measures supporting increased international trade in the past. The
advertisement ends with the statement “Call or write Senator C to tell him to vote for
S. 24.” International trade concerns have not been raised as an issue distinguishing
Senator C from any opponent. S. 24 is scheduled for a vote in the United States
Senate before the election, soon after the date that the advertisement is published in
the newspapers.
Id. at 331. Because the advertisement names specific legislation on which Senator C is going to
vote, the revenue ruling concludes that it does not constitute political campaign intervention for
the purpose of § 527. Id.
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Using revenue rulings to clarify statutory language would avoid
the burden of promulgating regulations. Regulations, unlike revenue
rulings, are subject to the highest levels of review within the IRS and
Treasury and generally afford the public notice and the opportunity
68
for comment. In contrast, although revenue rulings require written
approval by the IRS chief counsel and review by the Office of the IRS
Commission and by Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy, they do not
involve public comment or formal signature by the IRS
69
Commissioner and Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy. Revenue
rulings name the staff lawyer in the Office of Chief Counsel who is
the principal author and list that person’s phone number in case
70
further information is desired.
The appropriate level of judicial deference given to such revenue
71
rulings is less certain than that given to regulations. A number of
scholars, including myself, have argued that revenue rulings are
72
entitled only to deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., which is a
73
far lesser degree of deference than Chevron deference. Under
68. See generally IRM 32.1 (Chief Counsel Regulation Handbook); id. 32.2 (Chief Counsel
Publication Handbook); Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1727, 1728 (2007); Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of
Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239, 250–52 [hereinafter Hickman, No Man’s
Land].
69. See Irving Salem, Ellen P. Aprill & Linda Galler, ABA Section of Taxation Report of
the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 736 (2004); see also Hickman, No Man’s
Land, supra note 68, at 243–46 (discussing revenue rulings); Hickman, supra note 59, at 502–09
(same).
70. Salem et al., supra note 69, at 736.
71. Similar questions arise in connection with notices published in the Internal Revenue
Bulletin:
A notice is a public pronouncement that may contain guidance that involves
substantive interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code or other provisions of the
law. For example, notices can be used to relate what regulations will say in situations
where the regulations may not be published in the immediate future.
Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-IRSGuidance-A-Brief-Primer (last visited Mar. 13, 2014); see Hickman, No Man’s Land, supra note
68, at 249–52 (discussing the uncertain origins of notices); Hickman, supra note 59, at 468–70
(noting that the IRS “relies heavily on informal guidance documents,” including notices). To
simplify discussion, I am going to assume that guidance issued by the IRS regarding political
campaign intervention will take the form of regulations with notice and comment or revenue
rulings.
72. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
73. See Salem et al., supra note 69, at 744–46; see also Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive
Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081, 2109 (2005) (discussing the Tax Court’s traditional position on
deference to revenue rulings and the implications of several cases for that position); Leandra
Lederman, The Fight over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L.
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Skidmore deference, agency guidance receives deference as a court
sees fit, based on the document’s “power to persuade,” which in turn
depends on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
74
persuade, if lacking power to control.”
Whether revenue rulings receive Skidmore or Chevron deference
75
depends in good measure on how United States v. Mead Corp.
applies to revenue rulings. In Mead, the Supreme Court announced
that agency guidance merits Chevron deference only if “Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and . . . the agency interpretation claiming deference was
76
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” Applying this test,
the Court decided that a U.S. Customs Service letter ruling was
77
entitled to Skidmore, not Chevron, deference. Unfortunately, the
Court failed to specify the meaning of “force of law” and
“promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” It stated that
Chevron deference would apply “when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference
78
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” According to the
Court, “Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of
ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or noticeand-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a
79
comparable congressional intent.” The case did not fully explain the
meaning of “a variety of ways.”
In reaction to the Court’s lack of clarity, Justice Scalia issued a
strongly worded dissent. He criticized the Court for replacing the
80
clarity of Chevron with “th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances test.’”
He warned, “We will be sorting out the consequences of the Mead
doctrine, which has today replaced the Chevron doctrine, for years to

REV. 643, 663–71 (2012) (noting that “[c]ommentators generally support the application of
Skidmore to Revenue Rulings” but that the amount of “deference courts accord Revenue
Rulings is not entirely clear”).
74. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
75. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
76. Id. at 226–27.
77. Id. at 234–35.
78. Id. at 226–27.
79. Id. at 227.
80. Id. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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come. . . . The Court’s new doctrine is neither sound in principle nor
81
sustainable in practice.”
Mead has worried commentators as well. As Professor Ronald
Levin has observed, what the Court meant by the “critical phrase,”
force of law, “is not easy to pin down. . . . The Court’s commitment to
that [‘force of law’] test seems less than unequivocal, and the Court
82
also seems unsure about how to apply it.” Writing four years after
Mead, Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman concluded that Justice Scalia
“actually understated the effect of Mead,” when, in his dissent, he
“predicted that judicial review of agency action would devolve into
83
chaos.” To try to make sense of the case, Professor Sunstein has
analyzed Mead as Chevron Step Zero because it addresses “whether
84
the Chevron framework applies at all.”
Nonetheless, in a recent article, attorney Patrick Smith, who
85
often writes about the intersection of tax and administrative law,
concluded, “When the Mead test is applied to revenue rulings, it is
clear that they are ineligible for Chevron deference. Revenue rulings
are not issued using notice and comment procedures, and the IRS
86
does not claim that revenue rulings have the force of law.” Others,
however, have taken the position that revenue rulings, like
regulations, could or should be afforded Chevron deference. At one
time, the Department of Justice argued that such documents merited
87
Chevron deference, but it has since abandoned this position.
Specially concurring in a 2008 Ninth Circuit case, Judge O’Scannlain,
relying on the statement in Mead that delegation of authority could
88
be shown in any of a number of ways, wrote, “I hope . . . that the
formality of a particular agency action, standing alone, does not

81. Id. at 239, 241 (citation omitted).
82. Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
771, 774, 776 (2002).
83. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1443–44 (2005).
84. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006).
85. See generally, e.g., Patrick J. Smith, Chevron Step Zero After City of Arlington, 1140
TAX NOTES 743 (2013); Patrick J. Smith, District Court Misapplies APA in Florida Bankers
Association, 142 TAX NOTES 75 (2014); Patrick J. Smith, May Regulations That Violate the APA
Be Remanded to the IRS?, 141 TAX NOTES 84 (2013).
86. Patrick J. Smith, Quality Stores and the Status of Revenue Rulings, 140 TAX NOTES
1089, 1093 (2013).
87. See Marie Sapire, ABA Section of Taxation Meeting: DOJ Won’t Push Chevron
Deference for Revenue Rulings, 131 TAX NOTES 674 (2011).
88. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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determine the level of deference it receives.” In the case, Judge
O’Scannlain would have granted Chevron deference to a revenue
90
procedure. Since then, the Ninth Circuit has not resolved the
question of whether revenue rulings receive Skidmore or Chevron
91
deference. Recently, Professor Kristin Hickman has argued that,
because the IRS applied penalty provisions for failure to follow
guidance documents such as revenue rulings, these rulings carry the
force of law and would be entitled to Chevron deference, because a
taxpayer’s failure to follow them can result in penalties. However, she
also believes that revenue rulings, to be valid, must be promulgated
with notice-and-comment rulemaking as required by the
92
93
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for legislative rules.
Which of these views regarding the level of deference due to
94
revenue rulings interpreting statutory language ultimately prevails
will have significant consequences for IRS administration of the tax
law, not only in the case of any statute that defines political
intervention, but also more generally. From an instrumental rather
than a normative viewpoint, if revenue rulings issued without notice
and comment merit Chevron deference, the IRS may have little
incentive to go to the trouble of promulgating regulations with notice
and comment.
The Supreme Court could have resolved the question regarding
the level of deference to revenue rulings interpreting a statute when it

89. Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937, 946 (9th Cir. 2008)
(O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring).
90. Id. The IRS explains,
A revenue procedure is an official statement of a procedure that affects the rights or
duties of taxpayers or other members of the public under the Internal Revenue Code,
related statutes, tax treaties and regulations and that should be a matter of public
knowledge. It is also published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. While a revenue
ruling generally states an IRS position, a revenue procedure provides return filing or
other instructions concerning an IRS position.
Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, supra note 71. The Internal Revenue Manual
32.2.2.3.2 includes a similar definition. See IRM 32.2.2.3.2 (Aug. 11, 2004) (“A revenue
procedure is an official statement of a procedure by the Service that affects the rights or duties
of taxpayers or other members of the public under the Internal Revenue Code, related statutes,
tax treaties, and regulations, or information that, although not necessarily affecting the rights
and duties of the public, should be a matter of public knowledge.”).
91. See Taproot Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 679 F.3d 1109, 1115 n.14 (9th Cir. 2012).
92. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
93. See Hickman, supra note 59, at 542.
94. As discussed below, yet a third kind of deference may be appropriate when revenue
rulings interpret regulations. See infra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
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95

decided United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., in 2014. That is, the
Court in Quality Stores could have clarified, whether, under Mead,
such revenue rulings receive Skidmore or Chevron deference.
However, it did not do so.
The substantive issue in Quality Stores was whether tax under
96
the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), which encompasses
Social Security and Medicare, is due on severance pay that qualifies
as supplemental unemployment compensation benefit (SUB)
97
payments. The Sixth Circuit held that it is not. The Federal Circuit,
98
however, took the opposite position in CSX Corp. v. United States.
99
FICA does not expressly address SUB payments, and no
100
regulations address the issue. A number of revenue rulings,
however, perform this function—most recently, Revenue Ruling 90101
72. According to Revenue Ruling 90-72, SUB payments are exempt
from the definition of wages under FICA only if they are made to
involuntarily separated employees pursuant to a plan that is designed
102
to supplement the receipt of state employment compensation. The
ruling also concludes that payments in a lump sum cannot be linked
to state employment compensation and thus are not excluded from
103
FICA.

95. United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., No. 12-1408, 2014 WL 1168968 (U.S. Mar. 25,
2014).
96. Federal Insurance Contribution Act, I.R.C. §§ 3101–3128 (2012).
97. United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 693 F.3d 605, 607–08 (2012), rev’d, No. 12-1408,
2014 WL 1168968 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2014).
98. CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Government’s
petition for certiorari in Quality Stores also cites Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43 (1974), Social
Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946), University of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507
F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2007), and Abrahamsen v. United States, 228 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000), as
inconsistent with the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20–25,
Quality Stores, 2014 WL 1168968 (No. 12-1408).
99. See Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 611.
100. Id.
101. Other revenue rulings addressing the issue include Rev. Rul. 77-347, 1977-2 C.B. 363
(indicating that SUB benefits from trust fund established by employer are not wages for FICA
or the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), I.R.C. §§ 3301–3311 (2012)); Rev. Rul. 60-330,
1960-2 C.B. 46 (indicating that SUB payments made directly to former employees are not wages
for Federal employment tax purposes); Rev. Rul. 58-128, 1958-1 C.B. 93 (concluding that Rev.
Rul. 56-249, 1956-1 C.B. 488 applies also to similar payments, even if not union negotiated but
unilaterally established by an employer); and Rev. Rul. 56-249, 1956-1 C.B. 488 (indicating that
employer payments supplement SUB payments, not wages for FICA or FUTA). The 1990
revenue ruling discussed in the text reversed the 1977 revenue ruling.
102. Rev. Rul. 90-72, 1990-2 C.B. 211.
103. See Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 619.
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The Sixth Circuit rejected reliance on the IRS revenue rulings
104
“in favor of the expressed will of the legislature.” It looked to
legislative history, which spoke of authority to issue regulations
decoupling the meaning of “wages” for purposes of income tax
withholding and FICA. Given the absence of such regulations, the
court relied on the definition of wages in § 3402 of the I.R.C., which
defines the term for purposes of income tax withholding. Section
3402(a) defines SUB payments and excludes them from the definition
105
106
of wages. The Sixth Circuit cited Rowan v. United States, which
concluded that Congress intended wages to have the same meaning
107
for purposes of income tax withholding and FICA. Thus, the Sixth
Circuit found that the IRS revenue rulings conflicted with
108
congressional intent. Furthermore, according to the Sixth Circuit,
revenue rulings do not merit Chevron deference because, in issuing
revenue rulings, “the IRS does not invoke its authority to make rules
109
with the force of law.”
The Federal Circuit in CSX Corp., however, held that SUB
payments are subject to FICA. It did not read § 3402, the provision
excluding SUB payments from the definition of wages for income tax
withholding, as requiring that SUB treatments be excluded from
110
wages for purposes of FICA. That is, it rejected the taxpayer’s
argument that the term “wages” in § 3402(o) governs the meaning of
111
wages for purposes of FICA. Without specifying the level of
deference or the importance of consistency, the Federal Circuit found
that CSX’s payments would not satisfy “the IRS’s administrative
exclusion of SUB benefits from wages under Rev. Rul. 90-72 and its
112
predecessors, as the IRS has construed and applied those rulings.”

104. Id.
105. See id. at 611–13.
106. Rowan v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
107. See Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 613 (stating Rowan’s holding in this manner and citing
Rowan, 452 U.S. at 255–57).
108. See id. at 616–20.
109. See id. at 619 (quoting Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 347 F.3d 173, 181 (6th Cir.
2003)) (quotation marks omitted). “In appropriate circumstances we may give substantial
judicial deference to longstanding and reasonable interpretations of IRS regulations and
revenue rulings, but in this case we conclude . . . that the IRS has not taken congressional intent
fully into account.” Id. at 620 (citation omitted).
110. CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
111. Id. at 1345.
112. Id.
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If the Supreme Court had agreed with the Federal Circuit that
congressional intent as expressed in the statute is unclear regarding
FICA and SUB payments, the level of deference the Court assigns
revenue rulings interpreting a statute could have played an important
role in the Quality Stores decision. If revenue rulings are entitled only
to Skidmore deference, courts would be relatively free to provide
their own interpretations of the statute, particularly in light of
113
inconsistency in the SUB revenue rulings. If instead the Court had
accepted the arguments of those who argued for Chevron deference,
the position of Revenue Ruling 90-72 would govern, because agencies
114
are free to change positions without loss of Chevron deference.
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court had adopted the
position of the Sixth Circuit that the IRS revenue rulings are
inconsistent with congressional intent, it would not have needed to
reach the question of what level of deference to give revenue rulings
interpreting a statute. Clear congressional intent ends the deference
inquiry; congressional intent will trump administrative guidance that
receives Chevron deference, much less guidance that receives only
Skidmore deference. In fact, the Solicitor General during the oral
argument disavowed reliance on the revenue rulings and chose to rely
115
on the statutory text.

113. The taxpayer’s brief in Quality Stores argued that revenue rulings regarding SUB
payments do not merit Chevron deference and that they lack the power to persuade under
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), because of their inconsistency and lack of sound
reasoning. Brief for Respondents at 49–59, Quality Stores, 2014 WL 1168968 (No. 12-1408), 2013
WL 6492303, at *49–59. An amicus brief from the American Benefits Council, authored by
Patrick Smith, made similar arguments, Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Benefits Council
in Support of Respondents at 11–17, Quality Stores, 2014 WL 1168968 (No. 12-1408), as did the
amicus brief of American Payroll Association, Brief of American Payroll Ass’n as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Quality Stores, 2014 WL 1168968 (No. 12-1408). Professor
Kristin Hickman submitted an amicus brief in the case, arguing, as she has in her scholarship,
that revenue rulings are entitled to Chevron deference, but only if promulgated with notice and
comment. See Brief of Professor Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 28–33, Quality Stores, 2014 WL 1168968 (No. 12-1408), 2013 WL 6114794, at *28–33.
114. Justice Scalia explained in his Mead dissent, “As Chevron itself held, the
Environmental Protection Agency can interpret ‘stationary source’ to mean a single
smokestack, can later replace that interpretation with the ‘bubble concept’ embracing an entire
plant, and if that proves undesirable can return again to the original interpretation.” United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Aprill, supra note 73,
at 2113–18.
115. Eric J. Feigin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, stated during oral argument that “we
acknowledge that the revenue rulings are not consistent with the statutory text.” Transcript of
Oral Argument at 26, Quality Stores, 2014 WL 1168968 (No. 12-1408), 2014 WL 262860, at *26.
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The Court, however, decided the case in favor of the
116
government, based on its interpretation of the statutory text. It
rejected “the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of § 3402(o) as
117
standing for some broad definition principle.” The Supreme Court
118
relied instead on “FICA’s broad definition of wages.” It noted that
IRS revenue rulings, including Revenue Ruling 90-72, exempting
certain severance payments from both FICA and income-tax
119
withholding were “not at issue here.” Thus, despite the arguments
120
of the taxpayer and some amici in Quality Stores, the Supreme
Court did not provide guidance as to the level of deference that
courts should afford revenue rulings.
Under current law, in which revenue rulings interpreting statutes
are most likely to receive Skidmore deference, the BLP legislative
proposal would give the greatest force to the rules themselves.
Interpretations of the statute by the IRS and Treasury, whether in
regulations or revenue rulings, may be vulnerable to challenge as
inconsistent with the statute. However, as discussed below in
connection with the BLP regulatory proposal, revenue rulings
interpreting regulations rather than the statute itself may claim a
stronger form of deference than revenue rulings interpreting a
statute.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT’S REGULATORY
PROPOSAL
Should the BLP’s proposal be promulgated as stand-alone
regulations under the current I.R.C., rather than as regulations
promulgated pursuant to a specific grant of regulatory authority in a
121
new statute, different issues would arise as to their validity. Such
116. Quality Stores, 2014 WL 1168968, at *10.
117. Id. at *8.
118. Id. at *10.
119. Id. The opinion continued, “Because the severance payments here were not linked to
state unemployment benefits, the Court does not reach the question of whether the IRS’ current
exemption is consistent with the broad definition of wages under FICA.” Id.
120. See supra note 113.
121. For purposes of this Article, I am assuming any such regulations would be promulgated
with notice and comment, and thus would not raise the particular issues that ensue when the
IRS issues temporary regulations without notice and comment. See Ellen P. Aprill, The Impact
of Agency Procedures and Judicial Review on Tax Reform, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 917, 925–27 (2012)
(reviewing the “serious” validity questions that interim final regulations provoke); Hickman,
supra note 59, at 471–72 (noting the “significant potential difficulties for the stability of the
federal income tax system” caused by the interpretation of temporary regulations).
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regulations would be promulgated under the general authority of
§ 7805(a), which specifies that “the Secretary shall prescribe all
needful rules and regulations” for the enforcement of the Internal
122
Revenue Code (“general authority regulations”).
Until recently, it was uncertain whether such general-authority
Treasury regulations would be entitled to the same deference from
courts as specific-authority regulations. A long tradition, particularly
in the Tax Court, was to afford less deference to Treasury regulations
123
than that afforded by Chevron deference. This tradition relied on
124
National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, in which the
Supreme Court stated, in connection with a general-authority
regulation:
A regulation may have particular force if it is a substantially
contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to
have been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates
from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry.
Other relevant considerations are the length of time the regulation
has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the
Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress
has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of
125
the statute.

In other cases, the Supreme Court suggested that courts owe less
deference to a general-authority regulation than to a specific126
authority regulation. Before 2011, the Court was inconsistent in its
application of National Muffler and Chevron in reviewing tax
127
regulations.
The Supreme Court, however, resolved this uncertainty when it
decided Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v.
128
United States in 2011. In addressing a regulation promulgated with
122. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012).
123. See Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX
REV. 51, 67–73 (1996); Lederman, supra note 73, at 646; Salem et al., supra note 69, at 721–22.
The vast majority of tax cases are litigated in Tax Court, which does not require taxpayers to
pay disputed amounts before bringing suit. Leandra Lederman, (Un)Appealing Deference to the
Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1835, 1836–37 (2014); see Gerald Kafka, Choice of Forum in Federal
Civil Tax Litigation (Part I), PRACTICAL TAX LAW., Winter 2011, at 55, 60.
124. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
125. Id. at 477.
126. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713
(2011) (describing the inconsistency).
127. Id. at 712.
128. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
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notice and comment under the general authority of § 7805, the Court
declared: “We see no reason why our review of tax regulations should
not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same
129
extent as our review of other regulations.” The Court in Mayo also
noted that “we are not inclined to carve out an approach to
administrative review good for tax law only. To the contrary, we have
expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform
130
approach to judicial review of administrative action.’”
That general-authority regulations receive judicial deference to
the same extent as specific-authority regulations, however, does not
resolve all the administrative law issues raised by the BLP regulatory
proposal. Recall, as discussed above, that Chevron deference requires
ambiguity in expressed congressional intent. Congressional intent
clearly appears ambiguous under the language of §§ 501(c)(3), 4955,
4945, 6033(e), and 162(e)(1)(B), in which the statutory language
explicitly refers to political intervention but fails to define the term in
131
any detail. Indeed, given the failure of Congress to provide any
definition of the term, it is hard to imagine a court holding that
regulations defining the term and promulgated under the general
authority of § 7805(a) could be inconsistent with congressional intent.
That is, counterintuitively, regulations defining political campaign
intervention under these provisions pursuant to the general authority
of § 7805(a) may be less vulnerable to attack than those promulgated
under the detailed grant of regulatory authority under the BLP
legislative proposal.
Chevron deference also requires fidelity to congressional intent.
When it comes to defining political campaign intervention for the
purpose of permitting some amount of such activity by other § 501(c)
entities, congressional intent is less clear. That is, intent may be
lacking rather than ambiguous. As noted earlier, under the language
of § 501(c)(4) of the I.R.C., organizations must be operated
129. Id. at 713.
130. Id. (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)).
131. The provisions do not all use the same language, however. Section 501(c)(3) requires
that an organization exempt under this section “not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition
to) any candidate for public office.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). Section 4955, which imposes an
excise tax on the political expenditures of such organization, id. § 4955, uses the same language,
as does § 162(e)(1)(B), which denies any business deduction for political expenditures. Id.
§ 162(e)(1)(B). Section 6033(e) cross-references to § 162(e)(1). Id. § 6033(e). Section 4945
imposes an excise tax on private foundations that “influence the outcome of any specific public
election.” Id. § 4945.
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132

“exclusively for the promotion of social welfare.” It is a regulation
promulgated in 1959, not a statute, that allows such an organization to
be “primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good
133
and general welfare of the people of the community.” The
regulations also specify that “promotion of social welfare does not
include direct or indirect participation or intervention in political
campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public
134
office.”
Recently, the IRS and Treasury issued proposed regulations for
§ 501(c)(4) organizations that would broaden the scope of what the
proposed regulations now call “candidate-related political activity” to
include, for example, nonpartisan voter registration and candidate
135
forums. The proposed regulations, however, do not specify the level
136
of required social welfare activity. The proposed regulations have
137
generated enormous controversy. The IRS received more than
138
140,000 comments on them. The BLP reaction, for example, in a
fifty-six-page comment, welcomed “the IRS’s much-needed
132. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990) (emphasis added).
134. Id. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(ii).
135. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2), 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,541–42 (Nov. 29,
2013). The proposed regulations would also define candidate-related political activity to include
any public communication “within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election
that refers to one or more clearly identified candidates in that election or, in the case of a
general election, refers to one or more political parties represented in that election.” Id. at
71,541.
136. The NPRM asks for comments on this question. Id. at 71,537–38.
137. See, e.g., Diana Aviv & Gary D. Bass, IRS Plan on Nonprofit Political Work
Undermines Democracy, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Dec. 3, 2013), http://philanthropy.com/
article/IRS-Plan-on-Nonprofit/143351; Bob Bauer, The IRS Proposed Rules on (c)(4) Political
Activity, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW BLOG (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.moresoft
moneyhardlaw.com/2013/12/the-irs-proposed-rules-on-c4-political-activity; Ctr. for Competitive
Politics, No Good Speech Unpunished: New Model Regulations Would Muzzle Charities’ Speech,
CAMPAIGN FREEDOM (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2013/12/06/no-goodspeech-unpunished-new-model-regulations-would-muzzle-charities-speech; Stephanie Drahan,
New IRS Proposal for Tax Exempt Groups “Important First Step Against Abuse” Says League,
LEAGUE WOMEN VOTERS (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.lwv.org/press-releases/new-irs-proposaltax-exempt-groups-important-first-step-against-abuse-says-league; Matea Gold, New IRS Rules
Add Both Clarity and Confusion About the Role of Advocacy Groups in Politics, WASH. POST
(Nov. 29, 2013, 6:11 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/new-irs-rules-add-bothclarity-and-confusion-about-the-role-of-advocacy-groups-in-politics/2013/11/28/19e76286-578411e3-835d-e7173847c7cc_story.html.
138. See Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Activities on Candidate-Related Political
Activities (Reg. 134417-13), REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;
rpp=25;so=DESC;sb=postedDate;po=0;dct=PS;D=IRS-2013-0038;refD=IRS-2013-0038-0001
(last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
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attention” to the issues, but concluded that the initial proposal
required “very significant improvements in order to achieve its
objectives, provide fair treatment of all 501(c) organizations, and
avoid interference with legitimate, nonpartisan activities of nonprofit
139
organizations.” It urged Treasury “to substantially rework the
140
proposal and provide the public another opportunity to comment.”
The proposed regulations have prompted additional
141
congressional scrutiny and have come under criticism from both the
142
Many have predicted that they will be
right and the left.
143
substantially changed; others have urged their withdrawal.
Nonetheless, Lisa Zarlenga, Treasury Tax Legislative Counsel, has
announced that the IRS will hold a hearing on the proposed
144
regulations in the spring of 2014.
Some have argued, both during and prior to the recent
controversy regarding the eligibility of Tea Party groups for
§ 501(c)(4) status, that the IRS ignored congressional intent in
145
permitting any campaign intervention by such groups.
Thus,
whether or not the proposed regulations defining candidate-related
activity are finalized, it is possible that a court would find that
§ 501(c)(4) does not permit political intervention. Under Chevron,
congressional silence, however, is ambiguous and, as a result, the 1959

139. Comment from Gregory L. Colvin, Chair, Drafting Comm., Bright Lines Project, Lisa
Gilbert, Director, Congress Watch and Bright Lines Project, to Amy F. Giulano, Office of the
Assoc. Chief Counsel (Tax Exempt and Gov’t Entities), RE: Proposed Guidance for TaxExempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities 1 (Feb. 27,
2014), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Bright%20Lines%20Project%20Comment
%20FINAL%20with%20exhibit.pdf.
140. Id.
141. See Fred Stokeld, At Hearing, Proposed Rules on Social Welfare Groups Described as
Harmful to Free Speech, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 28, 2014, available at LEXIS, 2014 TNT 40-5.
142. See Lauren French, IRS Hit from All Political Stripes on Nonprofit Rules, POLITICO
PRO (Mar. 3, 2014, 5:05 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/irs-hit-from-all-politicalstripes-on-nonprofit-rules-104146.html; Matea Gold, IRS Plan To Curb Politically Active
Groups Is Threatened by Opposition from Both Sides, WASH. POST. POL. (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/irs-plan-to-curb-politically-active-groups-threatenedby-opposition-from-both-sides/2014/02/12/99dcfd2a-932a-11e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da_story.html.
143. See French, supra note 142; Gold, supra note 142.
144. See Fred Stokeld, William Hoffman & David van den Berg, IRS Hearing Likely in the
Spring on Proposed Social Welfare Group Guidance, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 3, 2014,
available at LEXIS, 2014 TNT 41-16.
145. Alan B. Morrison, Focusing on the Wrong IRS 501(c)(4) Scandal, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 29, 2013, 5:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-b-morrison/irs-501c4-scandal_b_
3353468.html; Van Hollen et al. v. IRS, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/litigation/forms/
cases/getlinkforcase.cfm?cID=838 (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
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regulations or any new § 501(c)(4) final regulations specifying the
permissible levels of political campaign intervention could well be
entitled to Chevron deference. Whether § 501(c)(4) organizations
may engage in some or no political intervention, however, such
groups need to know what activities do and do not amount to political
intervention, and regulations defining political campaign intervention
themselves would almost surely be afforded Chevron deference.
In the case of other § 501(c) organizations, such as § 501(c)(5)
labor organizations and § 501(c)(6) trade associations, regulations
defining political campaign intervention would not clarify either
146
statutory or other regulatory language. As in the case of § 501(c)(4)
organizations, nothing in the I.R.C. refers to permission for or limits
147
on political intervention.
In the case of these organizations,
however, the IRS has recognized their ability to engage in some
amount of political intervention, but it has done so in guidance
entitled to less deference than general-authority regulations
promulgated with notice and comment. General Counsel
Memorandum (GCM) 34233 extended to § 501(c)(5) and § 501(c)(6)
organizations the ability to engage in some political campaign
148
intervention. It stated that “if the primary purpose or activity of an
organization is to engage is [sic] political action, then we believe it is
not organized primarily as a business league and cannot qualify for
149
exemption under section 501(c)(6).” The GCM also noted that “if
the primary purpose and activities of an organization otherwise
qualify it under section 501(c)(6), then participation in political
150
activities will not disqualify it from exemption.”
146. The recently proposed § 501(c)(4) regulations ask for comments about extending the
proposed regulations to § 501(c)(5) and § 501(c)(6) organizations. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2), 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,537 (Nov. 29, 2013).
147. The next several paragraphs are drawn from Aprill, supra note 8, at 381.
148. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969).
Formerly prepared by the Interpretative Division, GCMs originally were the way the
Office of Chief Counsel communicated legal advice [in the context of private letter
rulings and revenue rulings] to the IRS assistant commissioner (technical), which
eventually merged into the [O]ffice of [C]hief [C]ounsel. After that point, GCMs
became the formal legal opinion of the chief counsel responding to inquiries from a
National Office function outside of chief counsel or explaining the legal basis for the
position taken in a TAM, letter ruling, or revenue ruling. . . . GCMs are rarely written
anymore except to repeal old GCMs.
Marion Marshall, Sheryl Stratton & Christopher Bergin, The Changing Landscape of IRS
Guidance: A Downward Slope, 90 TAX NOTES 673, 679 (2001).
149. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233.
150. Id. See generally JOHN FRANCIS REILLY & BARBARA A. BRAIG ALLEN, POLITICAL
CAMPAIGN AND LOBBYING ACTIVITIES OF IRC 501(C)(4), (C)(5), AND (C)(6) ORGANIZATIONS
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Private letter rulings, which are written statements on issues
addressed to taxpayers who have requested the rulings, and which are
151
not authority on which other taxpayers can rely, address § 501(c)(8)
fraternal beneficiary societies and § 501(c)(19) veterans’
152
organizations.
Two private letter rulings acknowledge that a
§ 501(c)(8) organization can, without endangering its exemption,
establish a separate segregated fund as a political action committee
and transfer a portion of dues to it promptly and directly so that the
transferred amounts will not be considered political campaign
intervention subject to tax under § 527(f) by the § 501(c)(8)
153
organization itself. By discussing the possibility of the § 501(c)(8)
organization being subject to tax under § 527(f), the private letter
rulings assume that the organization could engage in political
campaign intervention directly. Neither ruling discusses how much
political campaign intervention would be permissible for a § 501(c)(8)
organization.
The private ruling addressing § 501(c)(19) veterans’
154
organizations, however, does consider this issue. In deciding that a
§ 501(c)(19) veterans’ association may establish a political action
committee, the ruling, issued shortly after enactment of § 501(c)(19),
reasoned that a § 501(c) organization can establish a separate

(2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf (providing exempt
organizations with information about the rules relating to political campaign and lobbying
activities).
151. A private letter ruling (PLR)
is a written statement issued to a taxpayer that interprets and applies tax laws to the
taxpayer’s specific set of facts. A [PLR] is issued to establish with certainty the
federal tax consequences of a particular transaction before the transaction is
consummated or before the taxpayer’s return is filed. A PLR is issued in response to
a written request submitted by a taxpayer and is binding on the IRS if the taxpayer
fully and accurately described the proposed transaction in the request and carries out
the transaction as described. A PLR may not be relied on as precedent by other
taxpayers or IRS personnel. PLRs are generally made public after all information has
been removed that could identify the taxpayer to whom it was issued.
Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, supra note 71. See generally IRM 32.3.2 (Oct. 25,
2011) (providing guidance to taxpayers regarding letter rulings). Tax professionals, however,
study private letter rulings to glean the attitude of the IRS as well as to study the reasoning and
authorities the private letter rulings employ.
152. The recently proposed § 501(c)(4) regulations make no reference to and do not ask for
comments defining political campaign intervention in the case of § 501(c)(8) or § 501(c)(19)
organizations. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2), 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,536–37 (Nov.
29, 2013) (limiting the proposed rulemaking to § 501(c)(4) organizations).
153. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-52-037 (Oct. 4, 1988); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-42-100 (July
20, 1983).
154. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-04-064 (Oct. 25, 1978).
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segregated fund under § 527(f)(3) only if political campaign activity is
consistent with its exempt purpose. Veterans’ organizations, it
observes, are tax-exempt either under § 501(c)(4) or under the newly
enacted § 501(c)(19). It continues:
Concerning organizations which are tax exempt under section
501(c)(19), the legislative history connected with the enactment of
this section does not indicate congressional intent to either increase
or diminish the extent that veterans organizations may be involved
in political activities. The Code and Regulations themselves are
silent as to the permissibility or extent of political participation or
155
intervention on the part of section 501(c)(19) organizations.

This ruling thus suggests that § 501(c)(19) organizations can engage in
political campaign intervention to the same extent, but not more than,
156
§ 501(c)(4) organizations.
To date, no court has granted Chevron deference to either
157
GCMs or private letter rulings, and there is little likelihood that,
given their nature, any court would do so. Nonetheless, as with
§ 501(c)(4) organizations, these other § 501(c) organizations need to
know what activities constitute political intervention, and whether
they are ultimately prohibited from engaging or permitted to engage
to some extent in such activity. Thus, courts are likely to see
congressional silence about the amount of political campaign
intervention permitted by noncharitable § 501(c) organizations as an
ambiguity that would result in the BLP regulatory approach receiving
Chevron deference as applied to these entities as well. Although
courts are not consistent regarding when they find a statute to be
158
silent about a particular issue, the Court explicitly stated in Chevron
that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific

155. Id.
156. In contrast, Hill and Mancino believe that veterans’ organizations “may engage in
unlimited lobbying and political activities.” See FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO,
TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS ¶ 19.02[1] (2002).
157. See Hickman, No Man’s Land, supra note 68, at 256–57. Neither private letter rulings
nor GCMs are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. Moreover, as noted above, a private
letter ruling “may not be relied on as precedent by other taxpayers or IRS personnel.”
Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, supra note 71.
158. See Aprill, supra note 73, at 2091–94 (discussing two contrasting judicial opinions as to
whether a statute was silent or ambiguous).
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issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is
159
based on a permissible construction of the statute.”
From an administrative law perspective, predicting the status of
any revenue rulings published to clarify the BLP regulatory proposal
becomes both challenging and intriguing. Earlier, I discussed the
dispute as to whether revenue rulings receive Chevron or Skidmore
deference. If, however, revenue rulings clarify Treasury regulations
rather than statutory language, such rulings could be subject to
Auer/Seminole Rock deference.
Auer/Seminole Rock deference declares that an agency’s
construction of its own regulations is to receive “controlling weight
160
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” A
recent article describes the best justifications for this strong deference
as “pragmatic”—that is, they are based on notions regarding
161
“expertise, efficiency, flexibility, and accountability.” However,
questions have arisen about the doctrine’s continuing validity after
Mead and Chevron. Justice Scalia, the author of Auer, wrote recently
162
in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. :
For while I have in the past uncritically accepted [Auer deference], I
have become increasingly doubtful of its validity. On the surface, it
seems to be a natural corollary—indeed, an a fortiori application—
of the rule that we will defer to an agency’s interpretation of the
statute it is charged with implementing. But it is not. . . . [W]hen an
agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the
implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination of the

159. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(emphasis added).
160. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (applying the “deferential” Seminole Rock standard and
finding it “easily met”); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 518 (1994) (applying
Seminole Rock and holding that the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ interpretation
was “faithful to the regulation’s plain language” and thus controlled).
161. Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1449, 1460 (2011); see also Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of
Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 89–
99 (2000) (describing the Supreme Court’s justifications for broad deference to agency
interpretations of statutes and regulations); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 629–31
(1996) (discussing the rationale offered by the Supreme Court for applying Seminole Rock
deference to agency interpretations of regulations); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations,
111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 410–12 (2012) (positing a purposive solution to “the puzzle of how a
court is to judge when deference under Seminole Rock” is appropriate).
162. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011).
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rule’s meaning. And though the adoption of a rule is an exercise of
the executive rather than the legislative power, a properly adopted
rule has fully the effect of law. It seems contrary to fundamental
principles of separation of powers to permit the person who
promulgates a law to interpret it as well. . . .
. . . [D]eferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule
encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power,
in future adjudications, to do what it pleases. This frustrates the
notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking, and promotes
163
arbitrary government.

Disagreeing with Justice Scalia, the Talk America Court relied on the
Federal Election Commission’s interpretation of the regulations at
164
issue in its amicus brief, citing Auer.
Professors Pierce and Hickman have observed that “[t]he
Court’s continued commitment to Seminole Rock and Auer is
particularly interesting when one considers that Mead denies Chevron
deference to agency interpretations of statutes expressed in the very
guidance formats that agencies typically utilize to articulate their
165
interpretations of their own regulations.” Moreover, the Court has
in recent opinions emphasized situations in which it will not apply
Auer/Seminole Rock deference. It has explained that this doctrine will
not apply, for example, if the agency’s interpretation is “‘plainly
166
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’” if the agency’s
interpretation “‘does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered
167
judgment on the matter in question,’” if the agency’s position is
168
or a “‘post hoc
simply a “‘convenient litigating position,’”
rationalizatio[n]’” intended “to defend past agency action against
169
attack.”

163. Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
164. Id. at 2260–61. Other Supreme Court cases involving Auer/Seminole Rock deference
include Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v.
McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871 (2011); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007);
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); and Gardebring v. Jenkins,
485 U.S. 415 (1988).
165. KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. forthcoming 2014) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
166. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2166 (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).
167. Id. (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462)
168. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988)).
169. Id. at 2166–67 (alteration in original) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462).
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Nonetheless, a recent study shows that the Supreme Court is
extraordinarily deferential when it reviews agencies’ interpretations
of their own rules; it upholds the agency approximately 91 percent of
170
the time, while, according to another study, the federal district and
circuit courts uphold the agency under Auer/Seminole Rock
171
approximately 76 percent of the time. In contrast, Professor Steve
Johnson has recently reviewed Tax Court cases and has concluded
that the Tax Court has embraced Auer/Seminole Rock deference far
172
less than other federal courts. According to Professor Johnson,
The Tax Court typically gives at least lip-service to [Auer/Seminole
Rock]. Sometimes it even applies [Auer/Seminole Rock] deference
faithfully, in both cases in which the IRS prevails and cases in which
it justifiably should not. But it is hard to escape the conclusion that,
in the Tax Court, the [Auer/Seminole Rock] principle often is
173
honored more in name than in substance.

He believes that the reason for the Tax Court’s reluctance is that, as a
specialist tribunal, it is less likely to defer to the IRS than generalist
174
federal courts.
I argue that there is a reasonable possibility that revenue rulings
interpreting regulations (as opposed to those interpreting a statute)
could receive Auer/Seminole Rock deference in the Tax Court as well
as other federal courts. As Professor Johnson and I have both noted,
170. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?,
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011).
171. Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua A. Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 519 (2011).
172. See Steve R. Johnson, Auer/Seminole Rock Deference in the Tax Court, 11
PITTSBURGH TAX REV. 1, 24–25 (2013).
173. Id. at 28. In addition to Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 131 (2009), rev’d on other
grounds, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010), Professor Johnson, in his examination of recent Tax Court
cases, discusses Judge Cohen’s concurrence in Pierre v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 24 (2009), in
which she stated that the case did not “adopt the litigating position of the [IRS] as distinct from
preexistent and consistent administrative interpretations,” Johnson, supra note 172, at 23–24, as
well as Judge Wherry’s refusal in his opinion for the court in Carpenter Family Investments v.
Commissioner, 136 T.C. 373 (2011), to accord Seminole Rock deference to a preamble to a
regulation, Johnson, supra note 172, at 26–27. See Carpenter Family Invs., 136 T.C. at 379 n.4. In
2013, the Tax Court declined to grant Auer deference to the position of the IRS in a brief. See
Rand v. Comm’r, No. 2633-11, 2013 WL 6063566, at *11 (T.C. Nov. 18, 2013).
174. Johnson, supra note 172, at 36–40. He also believes, however that Auer/Seminole Rock
deference is a “dubious rule of law,” particularly because of its “pernicious incentive effects” for
an agency to write ambiguous regulations. Id. at 40, 45–50. He finds the perverse incentive
especially deleterious in tax matters, wherein “[v]ague regulations ‘clarified’ by explanations by
the Treasury or the IRS make it difficult for citizens to understand and so to fulfill their
obligation to pay taxes they legally owe.” Id. at 51.
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the Tax Court resisted adopting Chevron. It did so for largely the
same reason—its belief in its own expertise—that Professor Johnson
suggests for the Tax Court’s unwillingness to apply Auer/Seminole
175
Rock deference. Eventually, however, the Tax Court did in fact
176
accept the application of Chevron deference. It may do the same
with Auer/Seminole Rock deference. In addition, since Mayo, both
private practitioners and government lawyers have become more
177
sensitive to administrative law issues. In particular, William J.
Wilkins, the Chief Counsel of the IRS, has stated that he was
interested in seeing whether a case “would prompt a court to consider
178
the potential application[s] of Auer v. Robbins” to a tax case.
Therefore, government lawyers at some future time could well make
the argument that revenue rulings interpreting regulations should
receive Auer/Seminole Rock deference.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Talk America recently
gave Auer/Seminole Rock deference to positions in briefs, including
an amicus brief. Nonetheless, the form of agency interpretations that
are entitled to Auer/Seminole Rock deference is a matter of
considerable controversy. As Professor Matthew Stephenson and
attorney Miri Pogoriler have explained, cases have afforded
Auer/Seminole Rock deference to an interpretation contained in no
more than an internal memorandum and agency practice or in an
179
inter-agency memorandum. Nonetheless, they conclude that strong
Auer/Seminole Rock deference should be reserved for
“interpretations issued in orders following formal adjudications, while
granting only Skidmore respect to interpretive rules and informal
180
order.”

175. Id. at 39–40; see Aprill, supra note 123, at 67–73.
176. Johnson, supra note 172, at 39.
177. See Patrick J. Smith, Life After Mayo: Silver Linings, 131 TAX NOTES 1251, 1254 (2011)
(describing the “tax community’s overreaction to Mayo”).
178. Jeremiah Coder & Shamik Trivedi, Supreme Court Has Put Regulatory Challenges in
Play, Wilkins Says, 138 TAX NOTES 1212 (2013).
179. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 161, at 1484–85 & nn.147–48 (collecting cases).
180. Id. at 1496. They suggest that the strong deference of Auer/Seminole Rock is
appropriate only “in orders following formal adjudications, which entail extensive hearing and
participation rights as well as significant constraints on the agency’s decisionmaking process.”
Id. at 1485–86. They are unwilling to look to the seniority of the official approving an
interpretation as a key factor because, they believe, “[a]n interpretive question significant
enough to attract the attention of a senior agency official prior to litigation is more likely to be a
question that is sufficiently prominent that the agency could and should address it through a
legislative rule.” Id. at 1492. I do not believe this generality holds for tax.
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181

Lantz v. Commissioner, a Tax Court case that involved possible
discretionary relief by the IRS to a statute of limitations, also
demonstrates the dispute about the reach of Auer/Seminole Rock
deference. The majority of the Tax Court relied on Bowles v.
182
Seminole Rock & Sand Co. in concluding that this special relief did
not apply. In dissent, Judge Halpern argued that the IRS position was
“no more than a litigating position,” and one “without merit, or, in
the language of Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., ‘plainly
erroneous’ and ‘inconsistent with the regulation,’ which would cause
183
its rejection in any event.” But Judge Halpern also suggested that
such deference might be available when the IRS position takes the
184
form of published guidance. Such would be the case for revenue
rulings interpreting regulations. That is, if Judge Halpern’s view
eventually prevails in the Tax Court, revenue rulings interpreting
regulations could well receive Auer/Seminole Rock deference.
In sum, the BLP regulatory proposal offers two distinct
advantages from the government’s point of view. It reduces the
possibility that regulations could be deemed inconsistent with
congressional intent and allows the possibility that revenue rulings
interpreting the political campaign intervention rules would be
afforded the strong deference of Auer/Seminole Rock.
CONCLUSION
We would expect that the surest and strongest way to ensure
establishment of rules defining political campaign intervention for
purposes of the federal tax law would be to enshrine the rules in the
I.R.C. However, because of a number of administrative law
doctrines—in particular the difference between the two steps of
Chevron, the holding of Mayo regarding deference to generalauthority regulations, and the possible application of Auer/Seminole
Rock deference to revenue rulings interpreting regulations, but not to
those interpreting statutes—the BLP regulatory proposal, not the
legislative proposal, offers those who have drafted the BLP proposals
and the government a greater ability to establish and clarify the

181. Lantz v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 131 (2009), rev’d on other grounds, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir.
2010).
182. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
183. Lantz, 132 T.C. at 151 (Halpern, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Seminole
Rock, 325 U.S. at 414).
184. See id.
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definition of political campaign intervention under the federal tax
law.
The contrast discussed in this Article, however, involves only two
possibilities: first, a relatively detailed statutory regime followed by
guidance in the form of revenue rulings, and second, sparse or silent
statutory direction followed first by regulations and then by revenue
rulings. Neither of these alternatives is desirable. Far preferable, both
in the case of political campaign intervention in particular and for tax
legislation in general, would be a process involving both Congress and
the tax agencies.
Congressional action, of course, represents the promise of
representative and responsive government. Having Congress enact
statutes ensures the most direct accountability to the electorate and
the perceived legitimacy of the rules enacted. One scholar has
articulated a particular need for congressional action in the case of
tax laws:
Taxing powers are, as a matter of history and practice, different
from other sorts of government authority. When government
commands that a citizen surrender money or property, it is essential
that the decision reflect a modicum of democratic accountability.
Democratically elected—and accountable—members of Congress,
rather than bureaucrats, should be required to endorse de facto
revenue measures and face the potential wrath of the voters if they
deem the taxes too burdensome or the program’s benefits too
185
ephemeral.

Of course, congressional delegation is important for major policy
186
decisions in general. Recently, in Loving v. IRS, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that Treasury regulations
applicable to tax-return preparers were invalid under Chevron Step
One, which requires that an agency give effect to the clear intent of
Congress, as inconsistent with the text, history, structure, and context
of the applicable statute. Loving relied on FDA v. Brown &
187
Williamson Tobacco Corp., which denied the Food and Drug
188
Administration authority to regulate tobacco products, to assert

185. Ronald J. Krotosynski, Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal
Service, the Power To Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 239, 246 (2005).
186. Loving v. IRS, No. 13-5061, 2014 WL 519224 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 2014).
187. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
188. Id. at 161.

APRILL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1672

4/21/2014 9:08 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:1635

that courts should not presume congressional intent to “implicitly
189
delegate decisions of major economic or political significance.”
In the case of political campaign intervention by tax-exempt
organizations, Congress has done more than make an implicit
delegation. Congress has assigned responsibility for interpreting and
administering § 501(c)(4) and other provisions of § 501(c) to the IRS
and Treasury by establishing these categories in the I.R.C.
Nonetheless, it is possible that regulation of this activity has itself
grown so politically fraught that it will prove difficult for Treasury
190
and the IRS to draft regulations that will garner public acceptance,
including not only the proposed regulations, but also the regulations
suggested by the BLP, given the thinness of the statutory base on
which the regulations must be built.
Thus, if our sharply divided Congress could agree on some
191
approach,
some additional congressional direction as to the
meaning of political campaign intervention by exempt organizations
would be desirable. At the same time, too detailed a set of statutory
provisions poses a danger. Such statutes risk ossification. Exhaustive,
finely articulated statutory provisions hamper administrative agencies
192
in responding to changing circumstances. Statutes with more
general guidance—that is, statutes that do not attempt to address all
possibilities, both present and future, followed by careful regulations
with notice and comment, and then by revenue rulings that receive
appropriate Auer/Seminole Rock deference offers a better model, if
only as an ideal.

189. Loving, 2014 WL 519224, at *8.
190. For example, the House has voted to delay for one year the finalization of the proposed
§ 501(c)(4) regulations. See Stokeld, supra note 141.
191. See generally, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the
Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205 (2013); Justin Levitt, The Partisanship
Spectrum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239491; Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes
of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011).
192. See Kyle D. Logue & James R. Hines, Jr., Delegating Tax 10 (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 391, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2402047 (“Even when the legislative process is working well, it may take longer for Congress to
pass a new law than it takes an agency to make a new rule.”) These authors disagree with
Krotosynski, supra note 185, to argue “that Congress should consider making more extensive
delegations of authority in the tax area—or, at the very least, that Congress should think more
expansively about what types of tax lawmaking power it is prepared to delegate.” Logue &
Hines, supra, at 4.

